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“......If you have to shoot, shoot, don’t talk!” – Tuco in The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. 1 Introduction
Climate policy making is complex because costs and beneﬁts are uncertain, arise at
diﬀerent points of an extended time span, and fall on diﬀerent countries and generations.
Nevertheless, it is generally felt undesirable to postpone action until all complexities are
sorted out. A way to deal with the complexities is to announce polices well ahead of their
implementation, in order to give involved parties a chance to prepare their compliance
with the regulation.
Two main problems are associated with such an “announce-in-advance” approach to
policy making, namely the “leakage eﬀect” and the “announcement eﬀect”. The ﬁrst
arises when participation and coverage of the policy are incomplete. If not all of the
polluting sectors or countries are subject to the policy, the response of unregulated sectors
and countries could undo some of the pollution reductions in the regulated sectors and
countries. The leakage eﬀect may be partial (emission reduction in one country is partly
oﬀset by increased emission in other countries), it may be negative, i.e., with reduced
emission also in the unregulated countries [see 1, 4], and it can be positive, i.e., give rise
to an increased overall emission (the reduction of regulated countries is more than oﬀset
by increases in unregulated countries). The latter case is referred to as the green paradox
[see, for example 7, 5].
The announcement eﬀect corresponds to actions taken by aﬀected parties immediately
after the announcement and before the policy is implemented. Two types of announce-
ment eﬀects may occur. The favorable type occurs when polluters start abating pollution
and accumulating credits, partly because it is less costly to spread abatement over time
rather than concentrate eﬀorts at a short period. The unfavorable type – vis-` a-vis the
intention to reduce emission – occurs when ﬁrms increase emission. They might have
stocks of polluting inputs that they would like to quickly use before they are no longer
allowed to do so. More subtly, but essentially through the same mechanism, the total
stock of polluting resources might be inelastic in supply, because a nonrenewable resource
2like oil, gas, or coal is involved. This is why an announcement of carbon taxation may
induce resource owners to lower prices and induce users to burn more fossil fuels. This
mechanism is studied in [3]. Its robustness vis-` a-vis the presence of diﬀerent types of
backstop resources (cheap or expensive, clean or polluting) is considered in [9].
In this work we study unfavorable eﬀects of announcing a carbon tax well in advance.
In particular, we show how the announcement entails an increase in the use of fossil energy
until the implementation date. Our approach deviates from the existing literature in three
main ways. First, we abstract from scarcity of energy resources, i.e. there is no stock of
energy resources that owners are eager to deplete. While the papers cited above all rely
on the scarcity of the polluting input to generate the paradoxical announcement eﬀect, we
show that scarcity is not required. This situation seems relevant to abundant resources
like coal for which the scarcity rent is likely to be very small.
Second, we account for the consumption-saving decisions made by households and
for the eﬀect of capital stock on energy demand. We thus pay attention also to the
dynamics at the energy demand side, rather than focusing on the supply side. The
build-up of capital is time-consuming so that investment behavior is forward looking.
When the climate policy is announced, investment responds and the change in capacity
aﬀects energy demand before the climate policy is implemented. The existing literature
typically assumes the resource stock to be the only predetermined stock variable [e.g.
6]. Abstracting from resource scarcity allows us to focus on other investment decisions
without losing tractability.
Third, we allow for a competition between conventional (dirty) and alternative (clean)
energy technologies. We show that the timing and technological opportunities of these
are crucial in determining the paradoxical announcement eﬀects. In doing so we extend
the model of [8], which investigates the incentives to build up solar energy capacity, to
the situation of pre-announced policies. The more general interpretation is that we deal
with investment in productive capacity as well as equipment and knowledge capital for
3abatement and alternative energy supply. We show that, depending on the relative cost
of both types of investment, a green policy announcement may paradoxically result in
increased emissions during the interim period.
The conventional view underlying the early announcement of a climate policy is that,
if ﬁrms start investing in abatement capital or alternative energy supply in anticipation of
the implementation of the policy, pollution falls because of the announcement. However,
our model suggests that the paradoxical result of increased pollution is more likely. To
show this, we assume in Section 3 that the policy takes the form of announcing that a
carbon tax will be implemented at some future date. At the time of implementation,
energy use falls so that output is lower. Since households want to smooth consumption,
there is a rationale for accelerating investment early on, giving rise to a larger capital
stock. The accumulation of capital raises the demand for energy before implementation
since capital and energy are (imperfect) complements as factors of production. Thus,
announcing a policy aimed at reducing the use of fossil energy well in advance gives rise
to the opposite eﬀect until the policy is actually realized. The result holds both when
the regulation policy involves a mild tax rate which reduces fossil use but does not induce
the use of alternative, clean (solar) energy as well as when the tax rate is high enough to
trigger a transition to solar energy.
In section 4 we extend the results by considering uncertainty as yet another driver of
paradoxical eﬀects. We incorporate uncertainty into the model by assuming that the gov-
ernment announces the intention to levy the carbon tax, but the date of implementation
depends on political conditions and is therefore uncertain. The distinction appears to be
important as it aﬀects the underlying mechanism that drives the paradox. In particular,
the continuity of the consumption process plays a key role in deriving the early announce-
ment eﬀect when the implementation date is known with certainty. In contrast, under
uncertain implementation date, the consumption path undergoes a discontinuous jump at
the (random) implementation date. Nevertheless, we establish the “green paradox” also
4under uncertainty, and show that it is driven by the same economic forces: anticipating
that the tax will reduce energy use in the future induces households to enhance saving
today in order to accumulate more capital that can substitute for the lower energy input.
Prior to implementation of the tax policy, the increased capital stock is associated with
increased energy input, hence the paradoxical outcome. Indeed, since uncertainty re-
garding implementation appears to be a common feature characterizing climate policies,
the negative eﬀect of the paradox may be signiﬁcant.
Of course, saving (capital accumulation) comes at the expense of consumption, and
the realization of the paradoxical eﬀect depends on a condition relating the production
elasticity of capital to the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. This condition
holds in any empirically relevant calibration and the paradoxical early announcement
eﬀect appears to be robust.
2 Competitive allocation
We build on the framework of Tsur and Zemel [8], who analyzed the penetration of
solar technologies in a competitive economy. In subsection 2.1 we brieﬂy describe the
competitive (unregulated) economy and summarize the relevant properties characterizing
it. In subsections 2.2 and 2.3 we extend the framework to better suit the present focus
regarding early-announcement-green-paradox phenomena.
2.1 The economy and energy tradeoﬀs
The economy consists of a ﬁnal good sector, an energy sector and households that own
capital and labor. The ﬁnal good is produced by capital, energy and labor inputs via
a constant-returns-to-scale technology, represented by the per-capita production function
y(,) of per-capita capital k and per-capita energy x, satisfying, for k > 0 and x > 0, the
5standard properties:
y(0,x) = 0; y(k,0) = 0; yk(k,x) > 0; yx(k,x) > 0; yk(0,x) = 1;
ykk(k,x) < 0; ykx(k,x) > 0; yxx(k,x) < 0; (2.1)
ykk(k,x)yxx(k,x)   y
2
kx(k,x) > 0; yk(k,x)k + yx(k,x)x < y(k,x).
In (2.1), the subscripts k and x signify partial derivatives with respect to these inputs.
2.1.1 Energy sector
The energy sector consists of fossil energy ﬁrms and solar energy ﬁrms.1 Fossil energy
is generated by burning fossil fuels at a constant marginal cost ζ. Solar energy is gener-
ated by capital input, denoted s, designated for that purpose (photovoltaic panels, solar
thermal collectors, wind turbines etc.), such that each unit of s generates b power units,
where b > 0 is a technological conversion parameter. Once the solar infrastructure s has
been installed, there is no additional variable cost associated with solar energy generation.
The cost of solar energy is therefore solely due to the capital cost. The two sources of
energy are perfect substitutes, thus
x = x
f + bs, (2.2)
where xf stands for the fossil energy supply rate.
Forward-looking solar energy ﬁrms determine their investment policy based on current
and future prices of energy and capital in order to maximize the present-value of their
proﬁt stream [see details in 8]. Their investment policy determines the stock of solar
energy capital according to
˙ s(t) = ι(t)   δs(t), (2.3)
where ι(t) is the investment rate in solar capital and δ > 0 is a depreciation rate.
1Solar energy is used generically to represent alternative, non-polluting energy technologies.
62.1.2 Final good ﬁrms
So long as fossil energy is used, the competitive energy ﬁrms drive the energy price to
the marginal cost of fossil energy supply ζ. At this price, ﬁnal good ﬁrms demand energy
up to the level at which the value of its marginal product equals the energy price:
yx(k(t),x(t)) = ζ. (2.4)
The demand for capital is set at the level where the value of its marginal product equals
the price of capital – the interest rate. At each point of time t, the equilibrium interest
rate equates the capital demand and capital supply, where the latter is determined by
households’ saving decisions.
2.1.3 Households
At time t, the representative household’s wealth equals k(t)+s(t), yielding the income
y(k(t),xf(t)+bs(t)) ζxf(t). This income is used for ﬁnal good consumption, c(t), and
saving (gross wealth increase), ˙ k(t) + δk(t) + ˙ s(t) + δs(t). Thus, the household budget
constraint at time t is
y(k(t),x
f(t) + bs(t))   ζx
f(t) = c(t) + ˙ k(t) + δk(t) + ˙ s(t) + δs(t),
which, noting (2.3), can be expressed as
˙ k(t) = y(k(t),x
f(t) + bs(t))   ζx
f(t)   ι(t)   δk(t)   c(t). (2.5)
The household derives felicity from consumption according to a strictly concave and






subject to the budget constraint (2.5), taking parametrically the ﬁnal good ﬁrms decisions
(2.4) and the solar ﬁrms investment policy, where ρ is the pure (utility) rate of discount.
72.1.4 Equilibrium
In a perfect-foresight, competitive equilibrium, the expectations of all participants are
fulﬁlled and no party has an incentive to alter decisions. The competitive (equilibrium)
allocation is characterized in Tsur and Zemel [8]. We summarize the salient properties
of the competitive allocation, making use of the following notation:
ζ
c = (ρ + δ)/b (2.7)
is the critical fossil energy price which just equals the imputed cost of the solar capital
required to produce one power unit at a capital price (interest rate) ρ + δ;
X(k,ζ) = argmaxxfy(k,x)   ζxg (2.8)
is the energy input demanded by ﬁnal good ﬁrms with capital stock k when the energy





Thus, in a competitive allocation, energy input increases with the stock k. This intuitive
property underlies the “paradoxical” outcome derived below.
It is veriﬁed in Tsur and Zemel [8] that investing simultaneously in both ﬁnal good
capital k and solar capital s can be optimal only when the values of their marginal products
are equal, i.e., when
yk(k,x) = byx(k,x). (2.10)
The byx term on the right hand side represents the marginal return to solar capital: an
additional unit of solar capital allows for the saving of b units of fossil energy with the
marginal product yx. The marginal product of capital yk on the left hand side represents
the opportunity cost of solar investment.
It is also veriﬁed (op. cit.) that in a steady state, where ˙ k = ˙ s = 0, the condition
yk(ˆ k, ˆ x) = ρ + δ (2.11)
8must hold. Steady state levels are indicated by a hat “ˆ” over a variable. A steady
state occurs when increasing capital further no longer contributes to the households in-
tertemporal utility. Equation (2.11) states that this happens when the net gains from
investment (yk  δ) equal the time cost of investment (ρ). The steady state properties of
the competitive allocation are summarized in:
Proposition 1. The competitive allocation processes converge in the long run to a steady
state, based either on fossil energy alone or on solar energy alone, according to:
(i) If ζ  ζc, then no investment in solar energy ever takes place (s(t) = 0 for all t  0),
and the capital-energy steady state levels (ˆ k, ˆ x) are determined by conditions (2.4) and
(2.11), with ˆ xf = ˆ x.
(ii) If ζ > ζc, then the steady state is based solely on solar energy with (ˆ k, ˆ x) determined
by conditions (2.10) and (2.11), ˆ xf = 0 and ˆ s = ˆ x/b.
This result is intuitive: if the energy price is low relative to the discount rate (ζ <
(ρ + δ)/b  ζc), the relatively high time cost of capital prevents the accumulation of
suﬃcient capital to render solar energy competitive relative to the fossil resource. In
contrast, if ζ > (ρ + δ)/b  ζc, the low discount rate generates abundance of capital in
the steady state and, in turn, low opportunity cost of solar investment. This, together
with the high fossil price, generates high returns to replacing fossil energy.
Economies satisfying condition (i) are called fossil-based economies, while those sat-
isfying condition (ii) are called solar-based. These labels describe long term behavior.
When the initial capital stock k0 is small, energy is ﬁrst derived exclusively from fossil
sources at the rate X(k,ζ) and investment in solar capital is delayed. For fossil-based
economies, this policy holds at all times. In solar-based economies (where ζ > ζc), in-
vestment in solar capital begins as soon as k reaches the threshold level km(ζ), deﬁned
by
yk(km(ζ),X(km(ζ),ζ)) = bζ. (2.12)
9Noting (2.4) and (2.10), km(ζ) marks the lowest k level at which investment in solar
capital is worthwhile.
We now describe how the solar-based economy evolves over time. To that end, it is
expedient to introduce the wealth variable
w = k + s (2.13)
and its particular threshold level
wms(ζ) = km(ζ) + X(km(ζ),ζ)/b. (2.14)
The characterization in [8] of the solar-based processes is summarized in:
Proposition 2. The competitive processes of solar-based economies (with ζ > ζc) evolve
along the following three consecutive phases:
Fossil Phase: While w(t) < km(ζ), only fossil energy is used at the rate xf(t) =
X(k(t),ζ) and no investment in solar energy is undertaken (s(t) = 0).
Mixed Phase: While km(ζ)  w(t) < wms(ζ), both fossil and solar energy are used si-
multaneously with k(t) xed at km(ζ), w(t) = km(ζ) + s(t) and solar energy gradually
replacing fossil energy: xf(t) = X(km(ζ),ζ)   bs(t).
Solar Phase: While w(t)  wms(ζ), no fossil energy is used (xf(t) = 0) and both types
of capital grow simultaneously towards the steady state.
During the ﬁnal, solar phase both k and s grow simultaneously and the arbitrage
condition (2.10) implies that solar capital equals the function S(w) deﬁned, implicitly, by
the relation
yk(w   S(w),bS(w)) = byx(w   S(w),bS(w)). (2.15)




2bykx   ykk   b2yxx
2 (0,1) (2.16)
10hence both solar capital, S(w), and the ﬁnal good capital, k = w   S(w), increase as
wealth w grows from wms(ζ) to the steady state value ˆ w = ˆ k + ˆ x/b, where ˆ k and ˆ x are
deﬁned in Proposition 1(ii). During the two earlier phases, one of the assets remains
ﬁxed while wealth w increases: s(t) = 0 during the fossil phase and k(t) = km(ζ) during
the mixed phase.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is similar to that behind the previous proposition.
Starting with a low initial capital stock, the return to investing in k is larger than the
return to replacing fossil by solar. Once a suﬃciently high level (km) of capital has been
accumulated, the opportunity cost of solar investment has fallen enough to make solar
investment proﬁtable. Simultaneous investment in k and s cannot apply immediately
since once k exceeds km, the return to further investment in capital, yk, falls below the
return to solar investment, which is ﬁxed by the fossil energy price as long as fossil is still
needed to satisfy energy demand (byx = bζ). Only after solar capital s has expanded
enough to fully replace fossil fuels (bs = X(km(ζ),ζ)), investment in both assets becomes
attractive. Then, abundant solar energy supply reduces the marginal productivity of
energy below the fossil fuel price. This reduces the returns to further investment in
solar, renders investment in k proﬁtable, and allows for simultaneous investment until the
return has fallen low enough to induce households stop investing further.
2.2 The GDP function




fy(w   s,x)   (x   bs)ζg s.t. s  0, x  bs. (2.17)
It is veriﬁed that at each point of time, given total wealth w, the values of x and s
(and k = w   s) obtained from the solution of (2.17) are consistent with the competitive
processes characterized in Propositions 1 and 2.2 We can thus use the Propositions to
derive an explicit GDP expression for each of the three phases.
2A third constraint: k > 0, or equivalently s < w, is guaranteed by (2.1).
11During the fossil phase, while s(t) = 0, w(t) = k(t) < km(ζ) and xf(t) = X(w(t),ζ),
the GDP function becomes
G(w,ζ) = y(w,X(w,ζ))   ζX(w,ζ),
which increases with w at a diminishing rate. To see this, use (2.4)-(2.9) and assumption
(2.1) to obtain Gw(w,ζ) = yk(w,X(w,ζ)) > 0 and Gww(w,ζ) = [ykkyxx   y2
kx]/yxx < 0.
Moreover, the function decreases with ζ:
Gζ(w,ζ) =  X(w,ζ) < 0.
During the mixed phase, while km(ζ) < w(t) < wms(ζ), k(t) is ﬁxed at km(ζ), s(t) =
w(t)   km(ζ) and xf(t) = X(km(ζ),ζ)   bs(t), and the GDP function is linear in wealth
w. To see this, let
ym(ζ)  y(km(ζ),X(km(ζ),ζ))
and use (2.14) to write
G(w,ζ) = ym(ζ)   bζ[X(km(ζ),ζ)/b + km(ζ)   w] = ym(ζ) + bζ[w   wms(ζ)].
Thus, Gw(w,ζ) = bζ > 0 and Gww(w,ζ) = 0.
During the solar phase, while w(t) > wms(ζ) and xf(t) = 0, the GDP function,
expressed in terms of S(w) of (2.15), assumes the form
G(w,ζ) = y(w   S(w),bS(w)),
which is independent of ζ, since this price is irrelevant for production and investment
decisions when fossil energy is no longer used. Using (2.10), we ﬁnd that Gw(w,ζ) =
yk(w   S(w),bS(w)) > 0, while (2.16) and assumption (2.1) imply





2bykx   ykk   b2yxx
< 0.
Thus, the GDP function increases with w at a diminishing marginal rate.
We summarize the above discussion in:





y(w,X(w,ζ))   ζX(w,ζ), w < km(ζ)
ym(ζ) + bζ[w   wms(ζ)], km(ζ)  w < wms(ζ)
y(w   S(w),bS(w)), w  wms(ζ)
(2.18)
and satises: (i) G(,ζ) and Gw(,ζ) are positive and continuous.
(ii) Gww(,ζ) < 0 for w < km(ζ) or w > wms(ζ), and Gww(,ζ) = 0 for km(ζ) < w <
wms(ζ). (iii) G(w,) is continuous and non-increasing.
The GDP function, thus, resembles a neoclassical production function, albeit with a
constant marginal product of (total) capital during the mixed phase. The latter property
arises because investment during the mixed phase amounts to installing solar capacity
in order to replace fossil fuels, which have a ﬁxed marginal product yx = ζ. Thus, the
return to investment equals the savings in fossil fuel cost which are constant per unit of
investment.
The GDP function G and the return to capital G′ are depicted in Figure 1 as functions
of total wealth w along the three phases.3 Note that the linear branch of the mixed phase
joins smoothly the curves corresponding to the fossil and solar phases. Note further, in
the lower panel, that when ρ + δ exceeds bζ, it equals the return to capital G′ at some
state w < km, i.e. along the fossil phase, hence the steady state must be fossil based (cf.
equation (2.23) below). In contrast, when ρ + δ < bζ, the steady state condition holds
in the solar phase, giving rise to a solar based economy.
2.3 Dynamic characterization via the GDP function
Adding (2.3) and (2.5) gives
˙ w(t) = G(w(t),ζ)   δw(t)   c(t). (2.19)
Let






3For brevity of exposition, we suppress the  argument from all functions when no confusion arises.
Thus, G′(w) stands for Gw(w;).
13total capital










w = k + s 
return to capital 
Gƍ
bȗ
Figure 1: GDP and return to capital as functions of total capital w.
subject to (2.19), given w(0) = w < km(ζ) and a constant fossil price ζ. Using (2.18) it
can be shown that:
Lemma 2.2. The consumption and wealth processes, c() and w(), corresponding to
(2.20) equal the competitive consumption and total capital processes, c() and k() + s(),
characterized in Propositions 1-2.
The proof entails comparing the solution of (2.20) with the competitive processes
characterized in the Propositions and is omitted. In fact, the necessary conditions for
(2.20) specify the dynamics of the consumption process as





14is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Consumption grows in proportion to the
diﬀerence between the net return to investment Gw   δ and the time preference rate ρ.
The boundary conditions include the initial capital w0 and the steady state levels ˆ w(ζ)
and ˆ c(ζ), satisfying ˙ c = ˙ w = 0, which are obtained from:
Gw(ˆ w(ζ),ζ) = ρ + δ (2.23)
and












is the capital elasticity of the GDP function, or “capital share” for short.4
Since the system of diﬀerential equations (2.19) and (2.21) is autonomous, c can be
expressed as a function of w. Taking the time derivative of c(w) and using (2.19), (2.21)
and (2.25) we obtain
c
′(w) = σ(c(w))c(w)
G′(w)   ρ   δ




v(w)G(w)   (ρ + δ)w
G(w)   δw   c(w)
. (2.26)
Equation (2.26), together with the steady state condition c(ˆ w) = ˆ c, deﬁnes the competitive
consumption c(w) for every capital stock w. This, in turn, allows to determine the time





G(w,ζ)   δw   c(w)
, t > 0.
The time trajectory of consumption is then given by c(w(t)).
3 Early announcement paradox
The discussion so far ignores the externalities associated with fossil energy due, e.g.
to polluting emissions. A common policy addressing such externalities entails taxing
4G(w;)   Gw(w;)w vanishes at w = 0 and is non-decreasing in w hence is positive at w > 0 which
implies the inequality at (2.25).
15emissions. In the present setting, such a policy is equivalent to increasing the fossil
energy price ζ. We call such price increase “carbon tax” and denote it by τ. If the tax is
imposed abruptly, the economy will respond promptly by switching from the competitive
allocation corresponding to the initial (low) price ζl to the allocation associated with
the higher price ζh = ζl + τ. Imposing such a policy by surprise entails discontinuities
in the consumption-saving processes and is unlikely to score high in public opinion polls.
Policymakers, then, opt to announce the tax policy well ahead of its actual implementation
in order to allow gradual adjustments to the forthcoming changes.
We show that the early announcement gives rise to an eﬀect akin to the green paradox,
whereby the use of fossil energy will actually increase, rather than decrease, during the
intermediate period between the announcement of the tax policy and its actual implemen-
tation. We assume that initially (without the carbon tax) the economy is fossil-based,
i.e., ζl < ζc (otherwise, no intervention is needed) and show that the result holds both
when the after-tax economy remains fossil-based and when it switches to the solar-based
type. In the latter case, we assume that the economy remains at the fossil phase until
the tax implementation date T.
We use the superscripts l and h to denote competitive allocation processes under ζ = ζl
and ζ = ζl + τ  ζh, respectively. The allocation processes corresponding to the early
announcement policy, with ζ = ζl until some known time T and ζh = ζl + τ thereafter,














subject to (2.19) with ζ = ζl, given w(0) = w0 < km(ζh). In (3.1), wT = w(T) is
free and serves as the initial wealth for the post-tax problem V (wTjζh), deﬁned in (2.20)
with ζ = ζh. The regulated value V r(w0jζl,ζh) depends on both fossil prices, while the
post-tax value V (wTjζh) in (3.1) depends only on the higher price.
The l and h processes, corresponding to V (wjζl) and V (wjζh), were characterized in
16the previous section. The early-announcement allocation processes, corresponding to




with α+γ < 1 and ϕ > 0. We maintain the general form of the utility function u() but
assume that
v(w,ζ)σ(c) < 1 (3.3)
over the entire feasible ranges of capital and consumption. With the inter-temporal elas-
ticity of substitution typically falling short of unity [see, e.g., 2] assumption (3.3), which
plays a major role in the analysis below, holds under any empirically relevant calibration.
The early announcement paradox is a direct consequence of the announcement-induced
decline in consumption (see Figure 2 and the appendix for a proof):
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the nal good technology (3.2) and assumption (3.3) hold.
Then, cr(w) < cl(w) prior to the implementation date T.
Note that the result is purely an announcement eﬀect: The two consumption processes
proceed under the same (low) fossil energy price and the same production technology
(both are based entirely on fossil energy). The diﬀerence between cl(w) and cr(w) stems
from the fact that the former is determined under the expectation that fossil energy will
remain cheap, whereas the latter is carried out under the expectation that the price of
fossil energy will increase at time T. Moreover, the comparison in Lemma 3.1 applies also
when the after-tax price is high enough to change the economy into a solar-based type.
(In this case, however, the comparison is restricted to the fossil phase of the regulated
process.) Indeed, it is not a particular post-tax behavior that drives the eﬀect but rather
the anticipated reduction in fossil energy use.
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation (3.2) is not essential and is used here merely to sim-
plify the analysis. In contrast, the elasticity condition (3.3) is essential and embodies
the tradeoﬀs underlying the eﬀect: the loss in utility due to reduced consumption in the
17w
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Figure 2: Consumption-capital curves under low and high fossil prices. The two vertical
and two curved dotted lines depict the steady-state loci ˙ c = 0 and ˙ w = 0 under the two
prices, with arrows indicating the transition from low to high price. The consumption
curves cl() and ch() are indicated by the thin solid lines starting at the origin and ending
at the steady states, deﬁned by the intersection of the corresponding steady state loci and
the diagonal dashed line c = ˆ Rw of (B.1). The regulated curve cr() (thick solid line) leaves
cl() at the announcement time Ta to join ch() continuously at the tax implementation
time Th.
interim period on the one hand, and the increased post-implementation productivity due
to capital accumulation on the other.
The consumption relation of Lemma 3.1 entails the opposite relation for the corre-
sponding capital processes. To see this, note, using (2.19), that the time trajectories of





G(w,ζl)   δw   cj(w)
, j = l,r. (3.4)




Moreover, during the the fossil phase w = k and the larger capital implies, noting






With energy being derived solely from fossil sources during the interim period, the early
announcement actually increases the use of fossil energy, compared to the case in which
no announcement is made. We summarize this property in:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the nal good technology (3.2) and assumption (3.3) hold.
Then, announcing that a carbon tax will be implemented T years from now increases
the use of fossil energy in the interim period, prior to implementation, compared to the
situation in which no announcement is made.
The Proposition manifests the paradoxical outcome in our setting. Anticipating the
future increase in the price of fossil energy, households respond by reducing consumption
and increasing saving in order to smooth consumption at the time of transition to the
carbon tax regime. Higher saving rates imply larger capital stocks and enhanced energy
demand, in contrast to the original purpose of the announced policy.
4 Uncertain implementation date
In the previous section we assumed that households know the carbon tax implementa-
tion date precisely and adjust their behavior so as to smooth consumption at the transition
time, giving rise to the paradoxical outcome. Here we show that the paradox persists
also when agents are skeptical about the government (political) capability or willingness
to implement the policy as announced, and take the implementation date T to be uncer-
tain. We conﬁne attention to the case in which the economy is fossil-based both before
and after the carbon tax is imposed.
Suppose that the implementation of the carbon tax τ, under which the price of fossil
energy increases from ζl to ζh = ζl + τ, is considered to take place at some unknown
future date T. The realization of T may depend on the successful ratiﬁcation and
19implementation of some international treaty, or on other developments in the global arena,
and is taken as exogenous to the economy under consideration. Thus, from the vantage
point of the economy, the hazard rate π corresponding to the random time T is constant.







where V (wjζ) is deﬁned in (2.20).













[u(c(t)) + πV (w(t)jζ
h)]e
−(ρ+π)tdt.








[u(c(t)) + πV (w(t)jζ
h)]e
−(ρ+π)tdt (4.1)
subject to (2.19) with ζ = ζl, given w(0) = w0. We compare the unregulated emission
path corresponding to V (w0jζl), under which no carbon tax is contemplated, with that
corresponding to V π(w0jζl,ζh), under which a carbon tax τ = ζh   ζl will be imposed
at an uncertain time T. The allocation processes corresponding to V π(w0jζl,ζh) are
identiﬁed by the superscript π.
The capital process wπ() follows (2.19) with ζ = ζl (the prevailing low price until the




















5In deriving P(w), use has been made of the property dV (wjh)=dw = u′(ch(w)), obtained by noting
that the current-value costate (shadow price of capital) corresponding to V (wjh) equals u′(ch(w)).
20Comparing (4.2) with (2.21), we see that the uncertainty in T, represented by the hazard
π > 0, aﬀects the cπ(w) process via the P(w) term, the sign of which depends on the







Gw(w,ζl)   (ρ + δ) + P(w)
G(w,ζl)   δw   cπ(w)
, (4.4)
from which cπ(w) is obtained, using the boundary condition cπ(ˆ wπ) = ˆ cπ, where the steady
state values ˆ wπ and ˆ cπ are deﬁned by
G(ˆ w
π,ζ
l)   δ ˆ w
π   ˆ c




l)   (ρ + δ) + P(ˆ w
π) = 0. (4.6)
The following relation between cj(w), j = l,h,π, is established in the appendix:





l(w) 8w 2 (0, ˆ w
π] (4.7)
hold prior to the realization of the implementation date T.
Uncertainty, then, reduces consumption but not by as much as would be implied by a
prompt implementation of the carbon tax.










at each point of time prior to the realization of T. This establishes the early announcement
paradox in the case of uncertain T. We summarize this result in
21Proposition 4. Suppose that the nal good technology (3.2) and assumption (3.3) hold.
Suppose further that households are skeptical about the government capability to implement
its policy as announced and take T to be uncertain. Then, the early announcement of
a future carbon tax policy increases fossil energy use in the interim period (prior to the
tax implementation), compared to the situation in which no tax is contemplated (and no
announcement made).
While households are unable in this case to ensure a completely smooth consumption
process at the uncertain implementation date, they can prepare for the carbon tax by
increasing savings (i.e., accumulating a larger capital stock as compared to the situation
where no carbon tax is anticipated) in order to use their larger wealth as a buﬀer to
moderate discontinuous change in consumption when the carbon tax is eventually realized.
In the meantime, alas, the larger capital enhances the demand for fossil energy and the
polluting emissions that come along with it.
5 Concluding comments
It is tempting to announce the intention to levy an emission tax at some later date
in order to grant households and ﬁrms a “grace period” during which they can adjust
to the forthcoming regime. This good intention turns out to be counterproductive, as
it increases emissions during the interim period before the tax is implemented. This
paradoxical outcome arises disregarding the scarcity of fossil fuels. Indeed, setting aside
scarcity allows tracing the paradoxical outcome to delicate saving-consumption tradeoﬀs
in household decisions, dominated by a condition relating the elasticities of (marginal
utility of) consumption and of capital.
The paradoxical outcome stems from the households’ desire to smooth consumption at
the transition to the after-tax regime. Imposing the tax renders essential fossil energy in-
puts more expensive, which in turn decreases production and consumption. Anticipating
these future eﬀects, households reduce consumption and increase saving well before the
22tax is implemented, giving rise to a faster buildup of capital in order to mitigate the fall
in energy use at the time the carbon tax is imposed. In the meantime, the larger capital
entails a higher rate of fossil energy use. Actually, when the tax implementation time T
is known with certainty, we ﬁnd that the consumption process is continuous at T. This
“consumption smoothing motive” is the driving force underlying the early announcement
paradoxical outcome.
The paradoxical eﬀect persists also when the carbon tax implementation time T is
uncertain. While the economic forces at work are similar to those driving the early
announcement eﬀect under known T, the two mechanisms operate diﬀerently. Under
uncertain T, households cannot predict the tax implementation date at which they should
smooth the consumption process. In fact, consumption will undergo a discontinuous jump
at this date and the adopted processes are tuned so as to minimize the expected utility loss
associated with the jump. The solution involves delicate tradeoﬀs but the paradoxical
eﬀect of increased fossil energy use persists at all times until the tax policy is realized.
Appendix
A Preliminaries





A(ζ)wβ if 0 < w  km(ζ) (fossil phase)
bζ(w + ¯ w(ζ)) if km(ζ) < w  wms(ζ) (mixed phase)
Qwν if wms(ζ) < w (solar phase)
(A.1)
where
β  α/(1   γ) < 1, (A.2)
ν  α + γ < 1, (A.3)











wms(ζ)  km(ζ)ν/α (A.7)
and
¯ w(ζ)  km(ζ)(1   β)/β = km(ζ)(1   ν)/α. (A.8)





β if 0 < w  km(ζ)
w/(w + ¯ w(ζ)) if km(ζ) < w  wms(ζ)
ν if wms(ζ) < w
(A.9)
Thus, v(w,ζ) equals the constants β or ν during the fossil or solar phases, respectively,
with a smooth interpolation along the intermediate mixed phase.
B Proof of Lemma 3.1
The solution of (2.26), under the appropriate boundary condition, is denoted c(w)
and referred to as the c(w)-curve. Adding a superscript, as in cj(w), signiﬁes the solution
under ζ = ζj. Consider ﬁrst the case ζl + τ = ζh < ζc, i.e., the economy is fossil-based
both before and after the carbon tax. In this case, the economy remains in the fossil phase
forever, with v(w,ζ) = β all the way to the steady state ˆ w(ζ) given by (2.23). According
to (2.24), ˆ c(ζ) = ˆ R ˆ w(ζ), where
ˆ R = (ρ + δ)/β   δ (B.1)
is independent of ζ. Omitting the ζ argument when no confusion arises, the following
characterization holds:
Lemma B.1. c(w) > ˆ Rw for w 2 (0, ˆ w) and c(w) > ˆ Rw for w > ˆ w.
Proof. Since c(ˆ w) = ˆ R ˆ w, equation (2.26) cannot be used directly to determine c′(ˆ w) as
both numerator and denominator vanish. However, c′(ˆ w) can be obtained by applying




′   ˆ Rσ(ˆ c)(ρ + δ)(1   β) = 0. (B.2)
24Since Θ(0) < 0 and Θ( ˆ R) = ˆ R(ρ + δ)(1   β)[1   βσ(ˆ c)]/β > 0, the positive root c′(ˆ w)
of (B.2) is smaller than ˆ R. Just below ˆ w, then, c(w) > ˆ Rw. Suppose that c(w) and ˆ Rw
cross at some state 0 < ˜ w < ˆ w where c(˜ w) = ˆ R ˜ w. Then c′(˜ w)  ˆ R. However, at ˜ w we
can use (B.1), (2.26) and assumption (3.3) to obtain
c
′(˜ w) = σ( ˆ R ˜ w) ˆ R
βG(˜ w)   (ρ + δ)˜ w
G(˜ w)   (δ + ˆ R)˜ w
= βσ( ˆ R ˜ w) ˆ R < ˆ R, (B.3)
hence the crossing cannot occur below ˆ w. It can be shown in a similar manner that just
above ˆ w, c(w) < ˆ Rw and a crossing cannot occur above ˆ w.
Note the crucial role of assumption (3.3) in establishing inequality (B.3). It shows
how the diminishing marginal utility competes with the diminishing product of capital in
shaping the form of the consumption–capital curve.
Next we compare cl(w) and ch(w) – the consumption curves under ζ = ζl and ζ = ζh,
respectively. With ζl < ζh < ζc, the two curves remain in the fossil phase forever.
Observe that ˆ R is independent of ζ and the steady-states corresponding to both fuel
prices lie on the straight line c = ˆ Rw. However, (2.23) and (A.1) imply that ˆ wl > ˆ wh
and therefore ˆ cl is proportionately larger than ˆ ch.
According to Lemma B.1, cl(ˆ wh) > ˆ R ˆ wh = ch(ˆ wh), hence the low-price consumption
curve lies above its high-price counterpart at w = ˆ wh. We establish now that this property
holds for all capital stocks.
Lemma B.2. Under assumption (3.3), cl(w) > ch(w) for all w > 0.
Proof. The result holds for w = ˆ wh. Suppose that the two curves cross at some point
(˜ w,˜ c) with 0 < ˜ w < ˆ wh. It follows that cl′(˜ w)  ch′(˜ w). Using (2.26) we ﬁnd
βG(˜ w,ζl)   (ρ + δ)˜ w
G(˜ w,ζl)   δ ˜ w   ˜ c

βG(˜ w,ζh)   (ρ + δ)˜ w
G(˜ w,ζh)   δ ˜ w   ˜ c
. (B.4)
All terms of (B.4) are positive, because both w and c increase below their corresponding
steady states. Thus,
(ρ + δ)˜ wG(˜ w,ζ
h) + β(δ ˜ w + ˜ c)G(˜ w,ζ
l)  (ρ + δ)˜ wG(˜ w,ζ
l) + β(δ ˜ w + ˜ c)G(˜ w,ζ
h).
25or
β(δ ˜ w + ˜ c)[G(˜ w,ζ
l)   G(˜ w,ζ
h)]  (ρ + δ)˜ w[G(˜ w,ζ
l)   G(˜ w,ζ
h)].
Along the fossil phase G(˜ w,ζl) > G(˜ w,ζh), yielding
β(δ ˜ w + ˜ c)  (ρ + δ)˜ w
or, using (B.1),
˜ c  ˆ R ˜ w,
violating Lemma B.1. It follows that the cl(w)-curve and the ch(w)-curve do not intersect
in the interval (0, ˆ wh].
At w > ˆ wh the inequality (B.4) and the signs of its terms are reversed, but a crossing
of the consumption curves can be ruled out via the same considerations, recalling that the
curves lie below the straight line c = ˆ Rw when the total stock w exceeds their respective
steady states.
Let λr(t) and λh(t) represent the current-value costate variables (shadow prices) as-
sociated with V r(w0jζl,ζh) and V (wTjζh), respectively. Under the early announcement
regime, we see, noting (3.1), that the current-value shadow price of capital w equals λr(t)
for 0  t  T and λh(t   T) for t > T.






However, dV (wTjζh)/dw = λh(0), hence the early-announcement shadow price of capital
is continuous at T (though the emission rate jumps from X(wT,ζl) to X(wT,ζh) on that
date). Moreover, since uj ′(c) = λj, j = r,h, the consumption process is also continuous





Although cr() and cl() proceed under the same price ζl during the interim period t 2
[0,T], each of them is carried out anticipating a diﬀerent price ζ from time T onwards
26(ζh for the former and ζl for the latter). This diﬀerence shows up in the transversality
conditions: (B.5) for the early-announcement problem (3.1) and c(ˆ wl) = ˆ R ˆ wl for the
unregulated problem (2.20) with ζ = ζl. As a result, cr() and cl() behave diﬀerently
already during the interim period, giving rise to (B.6).
Now, (B.6) implies that cr(w) < cl(w) for all w < wT. To see this, note that both
cr(w) and cl(w) satisfy the same ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation (2.26) with ζ = ζl. Thus,
if the curves meet at any state w they must coincide over the whole w domain in which
they apply. We have thus established Lemma 3.1 when the post-tax economy remains
fossil-based (ζh < ζc).
Next we examine the case ζl < ζc < ζh, in which the carbon tax induces a transition
from a fossil-based to a solar-based type. In this case, Proposition 2 implies that the
transition process does not follow the fossil phase all the way to ˆ wh. Rather, the economy
switches to the mixed phase as soon as its capital stock reaches km(ζh), then to the solar
phase when total wealth w reaches the state wms(ζh) on the way to the steady state at
ˆ wh > wms(ζh). Nevertheless, Lemma B.2 remains valid during the fossil-phase also in
this case. We outline the proof below, omitting the tedious derivations.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we compare the consumption-capital rela-
tion cc(w) obtained by solving (2.26) under ζ = ζc (the highest price for which the econ-
omy is still fossil based) with that corresponding to the slightly larger price ζϵ = ζc(1+ϵ)
with ϵ << 1, which barely suﬃces to turn the economy into a solar based type. While
cϵ(w), corresponding to ζ = ζϵ, can be made arbitrarily close to cc(w) during the fossil
phase, i.e., for w  km(ζϵ), the cϵ() process includes also mixed and solar phases, where
consumption changes appreciably. Integrating the equations of motion along the mixed
phase, we ﬁnd that cc(w) > cϵ(w) for all 0 < w < km(ζϵ) (i.e. during the fossil phase of
cϵ). Since cc(w) < cl(w) for any ζl < ζc, it follows that cl(w) > cϵ(w) for any ζl  ζc and
w  km(ζϵ).
In the second step we compare cϵ() with ch() for an arbitrary high price ζh > ζϵ.
27Both processes evolve along the three phases, with transition states km(ζ) and wms(ζ)
that depend on the fossil price. The comparison, thus, includes also regions where each
process proceeds along a diﬀerent phase. This situation complicates the analysis, but
does not aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome, whereby ch(w) < cϵ(w) for w  km(ζh), i.e., in the
region where both processes are in the fossil phase. However, cϵ(w) < cl(w) for any price
ζl  ζc. Thus, while in its fossil phase, ch(w) < cl(w) for any price ζl  ζc.
With Lemma B.2 holding during the fossil phase also when the carbon tax switches
the economy to a solar-based type, we can use the transversality condition requiring a
continuous consumption process at time T, follow the arguments leading to Proposition
3 and establish the Paradox also for this case. Indeed, it is not the peculiar post-tax
behavior that drives the paradoxical eﬀect but rather the mundane desire of households
to smooth consumption over time. To accomplish this, they build up larger capital prior
to the tax implementation. Since capital and energy are complement inputs, the demand
for energy increases as well.
C Proof of Lemma 4.1
We consider the case in which the post-tax economy remains fossil-based. The cπ(w)
process corresponds to the solution of (4.4) under the boundary condition cπ(ˆ wπ) = ˆ cπ,
where ˆ wπ and ˆ cπ are deﬁned by (4.5)-(4.6). We begin by comparing the steady state




l)   Gw(ˆ w
π,ζ
l) = P(ˆ w
π). (C.1)




π) = ˆ c








With u′′() < 0, it follows that u′(cπ(ˆ wπ)) < u′(ch(ˆ wπ)) and P(ˆ wπ) > 0. Turning again to
(C.1) and noting (cf. Lemma 2.1) that Gww < 0, we ﬁnd that ˆ wπ > ˆ wl when the hazard
28rate π is small. We show that this relation between the steady states extends to arbitrary
positive values of π.
Consider the steady state ˆ wπ as a function of π and assume that at some π value this
function crosses the constant ˆ wl so that the left hand side of (C.1) vanishes. However,
(4.5) holds for both cπ() and cl() hence cπ(ˆ wπ) = cl(ˆ wπ) > ch(ˆ wπ). According to (4.3),
P(ˆ wπ) > 0, hence the right hand side of (C.1) is positive while the left hand side vanishes.
Thus, the crossing cannot occur. We conclude, therefore that
ˆ w
π > ˆ w
l 8π > 0. (C.2)
Next, we compare cπ() to cl(). Since ˆ wl represents the steady state for the wl()
process, it follows that ˙ wl(t) = 0 at this state. However, the steady state ˆ wπ of wπ()
exceeds ˆ wl, hence ˙ wπ(t) > 0 when wπ(t) = ˆ wl. Thus, (2.19) implies cl(ˆ wl) > cπ(ˆ wl). We
show that this relation cannot be reversed at other capital states. Suppose otherwise, that
cl(w∗) = cπ(w∗) (hence P(w∗) > 0) at some capital state w∗ < ˆ wl but cl(w) > cπ(w) 8w 2













because the denominator of the second term is also positive at w∗. A crossing of the
consumption curves, with cl′(w∗)  cπ ′(w∗), can be ruled out also for w∗ > ˆ wl using the
same argument (since the denominator is negative above ˆ wl). Thus,
c
π(w) < c
l(w) 8w > 0.
We wish to compare the uncertain consumption curve also to its high price counterpart,
ch(). We use (C.2) to deduce from (C.1) that P(ˆ wπ) > 0, hence ch(ˆ wπ) < cπ(ˆ wπ). To
establish the same relation for smaller capital stocks, assume otherwise, that ch(˜ w) =
cπ(˜ w) at some ˜ w < ˆ wπ, where ch′(˜ w)  cπ ′(˜ w) but P(˜ w) = 0 (hence cπ ′(˜ w) = ch′(˜ w)).
This, however, implies (B.4) which can be ruled out by the same arguments used to
establish Lemma B.2, completing the proof of Lemma 4.1.
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